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AFTERTHOUGHTS ON THE SHORT-LIVED
EXPERIMENT IN DEREGULATION OF
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
David B. Ross*
By
Julius G. Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg, and Jeanne B. Herman.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1976. Pp. xvii, 218. $7.50.
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY.

The recent decision of the National Labor Relations Board
in General Knit of California, Inc. 1 perpetuates a controversy over
a monograph by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, entitled Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality. In
General Knit, the Board once again announced its intention to
overturn representation-election results whenever a winning
party made substantial misrepresentations which might have significantly influenced the election results. The opinion in General
Knit reinstated the Hollywood Ceramics Co. 2 standard for regulating the content of election campaigns, which the Board had
abandoned less than two years earlier in Shopping Kart Food
Market, Inc. 3
The majority in Shopping Kart had found support for their
decision that the Board should no longer probe the truth or falsity
of parties' campaign statements in the research which Professors
Getman and Goldberg4 later (with Herman) expanded into their
present book. The opinion of General Knit's new majority (a majority composed of Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, who
both dissented in Shopping Kart, and Member Truesdale, who
was recently appointed to the Board) accordingly imputed some
of the blame for the Board's misdirection on its earlier acceptance
of Getman, Goldberg, and Herman's conclusions.
The Board's sudden reversal of Shopping Kart can only exacerbate the notable instability of Board doctrine in the area of
union representation elections, although as Professor Bok6
* Member, Illinois Bar. B.A. 1964, Amherst College; M.A. 1966, University of
California, Berkeley;· LL.B. 1968, Harvard Univeraity.-Ed.
1. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
2. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
3. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
4. Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation
of Campaign Misrepresentation: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976).
5. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 40 (1964).
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pointed out, the frequent changes in Board policy concerning
campaign regulation probably result from a fundamental uncertainty over the nature of the election process and of voter behavior rather than from shifts in Board politics. Far removed from
the turmoil of a hotly contested election and unencumbered by
systematic research into the influences upon elections, the Board
and the courts normally derive their policies from axioms plucked
from judicial opinions. Justice Harlan's theory of the "fist-insidethe-velvet glove" 6 or Judge Learned Hand's classic warning on
ambiguous campaign statements7 are often impossible to apply in
concrete situations but furnish a conventional wisdom where the
influence of campaign statements and conduct on voters is unknown. Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 8 supplies a formula for the Board's regulatory
inquiries but calls for case-by-case distinctions which probably
outstrip the Board's assessment powers.
Professor Bok reasoned in a 1964 article9 (which inspired the
Getman studies) that campaigns will in many circumstances be
regulated, by whatever a priori standard, in ignorance of the ends
achieved. He argued, then, that union campaign regulation may
serve a dubious purpose, waste agency resources, and may as
often as not be harmful.
Against Bok's contention that, given our ignorance of the
election process, regulation of election conduct might not be purposeful, Getman, Goldberg, and Herman argue for a laissez-faire
approach based on their research, which suggests that campaign
conduct, by and large, has little or no influence on voters. Because they refute rather than merely question the old axioms,
theirs is a more startling position than Bok's, and it has provoked
highly critical reactions. Unions and employers, of course, invest
considerable effort in developing campaign issues, presumably
because their experience has shown such campaigns to be effective. And to many practitioners, as well as to the Board, the
authors' rejection of that experience is unjustified by their data,
6. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964).
7. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
8. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Under Gissel Packing, the Board may set aside election results
and order a rerun after finding "minor" unlawful campaign conduct; if it finds unlawful
campaign conduct extensive or serious enough to make a fair rerun impossible, it may
order the employer to bargain with the union on the strength of a showing, based on
authorization cards, that the union at one time had a majority, even though it lost the
election.
9. Bok, supra note 5.
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particularly as to the critical groups of undecided or "switch"
voters.
The Challenge to the Board's Model of Voting Behavior
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman argue that the Board, in its
decisions requiring pristine "laboratory conditions" 10 for all elections, has developed an erroneous model of employee voting behavior. The authors demonstrate that Board decisions characterize employees as attentive to campaign issues, unsophisticated in
labor relations, and easily manipulated by ambiguous statements
which may be interpreted as threats or promises. Getman, Goldberg, and Herman challenge this view. They analyzed thirty-one
elections (which were especially selected for the vigor of the employer's campaign), and intervi~wed (twice) 1,239 employees
(p.33).11 Their data suggest that voters in a representation campaign have strong and stable predispositions which depend on
their attitudes toward unions and on their own working conditions. Eighty-one percent of the surveyed employees voted in accord with those predispositions (p. 62). Indeed, even unlawful
campaign tactics, which occurred in twenty-two of the elections,
did not alter pre-campaign attitudes (pp. 115-16).
Relying on psychological and behavioral theories, the authors contend that these pre-campaign attitudes make up a
"cognitive structure" through which campaign propaganda is filtered and assimilated and that the attitudes can not be easily
changed by new information. Employees inclined to vote for the
union expect the company to campaign against the union and
discount its arguments (pp. 85-86, 124 n.20). In fact, both union
and company supporters are largely inattentive to the campaign;
on the average they recalled only ten percent of the company
issues and seven percent of the union issues (pp. 75-76).
According to the authors, then, the high correlation between
employees' pre-campaign attitudes and their votes refutes the
Board's model of voter behavior and casts doubt on its requirement of "laboratory conditions." This conclusion is strongly supported by the statistical analysis and probably does not contradict the experience of most practitioners, however skeptical some
commentators and the Board may be. The study's implication is
10. E.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
11. The first interview was held an average of eleven days after the direction of an
election, which is early in normal campaigns but not entirely before the campaign begins,
The second interview was held immediately after the election.
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unavoidable: the Board should not substantially regulate the content of campaigns, at least in elections where the margin of victory exceeds twenty percent.
Influence of Campaigns on the Undecided or "Switch" Voter
We have seen that eighty-one percent of the voters studied
followed their predisposition. The study's principal problem lies
in its treatment of the remaining nineteen perc~nt - the six
percent who were undecided voters and who expressed no precampaign intent and the thirteen percent who "switched" to vote
contrary to their original intent. As the authors note, these voters,
although few in number, determined the outcome in nine (or
twenty-nine percent) of the thirty-one elections {p. 103).
The authors reached the following conclusions about the
undecided and "switch" voters· {pp. 103-08):
(1) The undecided and switch voters who ultimately voted
for the company were no more familiar with the company's campaign than such voters who ultimately voted for the union, nor
were they more familiar with the company's campaign than the
employees who had originally intended to vote for the company
and did.
(2) The undecided and switch voters who ultimately voted
for the union were significantly more familiar with the union's
campaign than such voters who ultimately voted for the company. They were not, however, more familiar with the union's
campaign than the employees who originally intended to vote for
the union and did.
(3) A large majority of the undecided and switch voters
voted for the company. More specifically, fourteen percent of all
the voters may have been influenced by the company campaign
and only five percent by the union campaign.
(4) Neither the "undecideds" nor the "switchers" were very
familiar with either campaign.
Since the authors collected no data that could identify when
the new voting intentions emerged, they can only speculate about
the causal relationship between the union campaign and union
vote by the undecided and switch voters. Nevertheless, they do
conjecture that union campaign information won the new prounion votes, since "[a] change in those attitudes during the brief
campaign period without some new information about the Union
seems unlikely" {p. 106).
Although logic suggests that the pro-company votes by the
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undecided and switch voters should be similarly attributed to the
company's campaign, the authors' data were inconclusive. They
could not discover any company campaign issues that changed
attitudes, even when the company used coercive tactica, nor
could they say that those who voted for the company were familiar with the company's campaign. Instead, they conjecture that
any company campaign, whatever its content, because it typically occurs after the union has campaigned unopposed for authorization cards, demonstrates tha:t management is aware of
employee dissatisfactions and that that is enough to make employees reconsider their pro-union attitudes (p. 108).
The conclusion that company campaign issues do not influence undecided or switch voters certainly conflicts with the
collective experience of most practitioners, who generally believe
that in close elections issues make a difference. Moreover, if the
authors may speculate that union campaign information caused
five percent of all the voters to support the union, may not the
Board in General Knit similarly speculate that company campaign information caused the fourteen percent who were undecided or were switch voters to vote against the union? Indeed, the
Board finds support for its view in the authors' conclusion that
the mere existence of a company campaign may influence voters
since, as it asks "[H]ow could the employer's campaign have
been free of factual assertions?" 12 That the authors could not
identify any campaign issues that changed attitudes does not
mean that such issues had no effect.
The authors missed the significance of campaign issues because they did not design their field investigations to focus primarily on the undecided and switch voter. They only categorized
voters initially as pro-union, pro-company, or undecided, and
they did not measure in depth the strength and characteristics of
voter attitudes. Indeed, they only asked seven questions about
working conditions, and they limited answers to a three-point
scale: satisfied, dissatisfied, or uncertain. Employee attitudes
toward the union were also scored on a three-point scale: agree,
disagree, and don't know or uncertain.
In short, the authors' attitude survey was not designed to
reveal deep-seated but unarticulated feelings; and in fairness,
their limited time resources made it difficult to do so. Thus, for
example, the data showing that most employees feel that wage
12. General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, at 11 n.24, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687,
1690 n.24 (1978).
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issues are more important than job security issues contradicts the
experience of practitioners that issues of job security are far more
important than issues of wages. These doubts about whether the
attitude survey revealed employee attitudes and adequately
probed the cause of changed attitudes plus the authors' failure to
test the attitudes on at least one more occasion prior to the election - to learn how new attitudes develop over time - make
questionable the authors' conclusion that switching to the company is "more likely to be due to the intensification of currently
held attitudes than to new information conveyed in the employer's campaign" (p. 145).
Effect of Unlawful Campaigning on Undecided and Switch Voters

The authors suggest that even unlawfully coercive employer
campaigns do not significantly influence the voting decisions of
a large majority of employees. Again, however, the critical question persists about the influence of coercive campaigning on the
undecided or switch voters, most of whom voted against the
union. Despite the authors' inability to identify why the undecided or switch voters change their attitudes, the authors did, by·
isolating and comparing the effects of "clean" and coercive campaigns, persuasively show that the percentage of undecided voters
who voted for the company and the percentage of voters who
switched from pro-union to pro-company were not significantly
greater in unlawful elections than in "clean" elections. They also
concluded that the small percentage of voters influenced by campaign misconduct made a bargaining order an inappropriate remedy (pp. 115-16).
What makes these results particularly convincing is the authors' corroborating analysis of voter perception of unlawful tactics. Approximately one third of the employees reported that the
employer had used one or more unlawful campaign· tactics,
whether or not unlawful campaigning actually occurred. Reports
of unlawful conduct were not even more frequent when the conduct was coercive enough to merit a bargaining remedy order {pp.
117-18). 13 Thus, because voters believe unlawful tactics occur and
13. To isolate the variables of unlawful and seriously unlawful campaign tactics, the
authors took both the election cases in which official charges were lodged and the cases
in which no charges were filed. They asked an experienced administrative law judge (who
was, of course, acting unofficially) to decide whether or not a valid objection might have
been raised to the campaign and the materials used in it. The judge also determined
whether a bargaining order would have been appropriate.
Under Board standards, there were campaign violations in twenty-one of the thirty-
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perhaps expect them, voters are not influenced when they do in
fact occur.
Conclusion

Even though Getman, Goldberg, and Herman have persuasively shown that most pre-election attitudes are stable, they will
probably not dissuade companies from attempting to identify and
influence their employees' attitudes toward the company and the
union. Moreover, the study has also clearly failed to persuade the
Board, at least for the time being, to limit regulating campaign
conduct. The authors' most valuable contribution may be their
use of empirical research and analysis to make the debate about
Board regulation of election campaigns better informed and more
rational. The authors' definition and isolation of variables, their
logical experimental design and careful data collection, and their
use of statistical tools to interpret those data produce meaningful
results that can be challenged or verified. Their data raise further
questions but expand our understanding about the extent to
which Board regulation is appropriate.
one elections. Since the identification of unlawful conduct was wholly uncorrelated with
the perception of unlawful tactics by the voters, the authors reasonably question whether
or not Board investigations and findings are necessary.

